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MEREDITH GIBSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 960251-CA 
Priority 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
and by Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES and 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In this case, the issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether the District Court property granted U S West Communications, 
Inc. ("U S WEST") summary judgment on the claim of Appellant Meredith Gibson ("Gibson") 
for breach of implied contract; 
a. Whether Gibson properly presented sufficient admissible evidence 
to overcome the presumption of at-will employment and create a genuine issue of material fact; 
b. Whether, assuming the existence of an implied covenant not to 
discharge except for just cause, U S WEST had just cause as a matter of law to discharge 
Gibson. 
1 
Applicable standard of appellate review: A summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference to the decision. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 
1000 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the District Court properly granted U S WEST summary 
judgment on Gibson's claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: 
Applicable standard of appellate review: A summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference to the decision. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 
1000 (Utah 1991). 
3. Whether the District Court properly granted U S WEST summary 
judgment on Gibson's claim for severance pay. 
Applicable standard of appellate review: A summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference to the decision. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 
1000 (Utah 1991). 
4. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Gibson's Rule 
59 Motion, which was based solely on an argument that the District Court had made errors of 
law in granting summary judgment. 
Applicable standard of appellate review: The denial of a Rule 59 Motion may be 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n. Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western 
Constructors. Inc.. 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rules 56 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are determinative of the 
issues raised in this appeal. Rule 56 provides, in pertinent part: 
(c) . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(e) . . . When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. 
Rule 59 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes: provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action 
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(7) Error in law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
U S WEST discharged Gibson, an employee in its Security Department, following an 
incident in which Gibson disclosed confidential information to a non-employee, in violation of 
company policy. Gibson sued U S WEST for wrongful discharge (breach of an implied 
covenant not to discharge without just cause), breach of an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, failure to pay severance pay, defamation, and negligent hiring and supervision. 
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H. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Gibson filed her Complaint against U S WEST on September 28, 1993. Following 
discovery, on May 23, 1995, U S WEST moved for summary judgment on all of Gibson's 
claims. Oral argument on U S WEST'S motion for summary judgment was held October 2, 
1995. After taking the matter under advisement, on October 3, 1995, the District Court granted 
U S WEST'S Motion for Summary Judgment in a minute entry.1 
Prior to entry of the final written order granting summary judgment and dismissing 
Gibson's complaint, on October 12, 1995, Gibson filed a motion under Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, seeking reversal of the summary judgment decision. 
The Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Complaint was 
entered on November 9, 1995. See Addendum A attached hereto. 
There was no oral argument on Gibson's Rule 59 motion. On November 9, 1995, the 
District Court denied Gibson's Rule 59 motion in a minute entry. On November 28, 1995, the 
District Court entered its Order Denying Gibson's Rule 59 Motion and Objection. See 
Addendum B attached hereto. 
On December 6, 1995, Gibson filed her Notice of Appeal from the denial of her Rule 
59 Motion and the dismissal of her claims for breach of contract and for severance pay.2 
1
 Gibson stipulated to dismissal of her claim for negligent hiring and supervision. 
2
 Gibson does not appeal the dismissal of her claims for defamation and negligent hiring and 
supervision. 
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IH. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The District Court granted U S WEST'S motion for summary judgment for the following 
reasons: 
1. Because Plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence that she was 
employed for a definite term, the law presumes that Plaintiff was an employee at 
will, whose employment could be terminated by Defendant at any time, for any 
reason or for no reason, with or without notice. 
2. The presumption of at-will employment is reinforced by statements 
in Defendant's publications, all of which were issued prior to Plaintiffs 
termination, to the effect that employment with Defendant is at will. Such 
statements establish Defendant's intention to create or maintain an at-will 
employment relationship with its employees, including Plaintiff. 
3. To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff had the burden to present 
admissible evidence showing that notwithstanding its published statements that 
employment with Defendant is at will, Defendant manifested a contrary intent and 
communicated that intent to Plaintiff in a manner sufficiently definite to operate 
as a contract provision, and that the communication was of such a nature that 
Plaintiff could reasonably believe that Defendant was making an offer of 
employment other than employment at will. 
4. Plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence sufficient to satisfy 
her burden, as described above. Plaintiffs deposition testimony that an 
unidentified person in Defendant's employment office told her that her 
employment in Defendant's Security Department would be governed by the terms 
and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement is insufficient to raise an issue 
of material fact. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was not a member of the union 
during her tenure in the Security Department. Furthermore, the statement cannot 
be imputed to Defendant in the absence of foundational evidence as to the identity 
or authority of the person making the statement. Such evidence was wholly 
lacking. Finally, neither Plaintiffs understanding of her employment 
relationship, nor Defendant's general assurances regarding an ongoing 
employment relationship, are sufficient to demonstrate Defendant's intent to alter 
Plaintiffs presumed at-will status. 
5. Even if an implied covenant not to discharge except for just cause 
existed, Plaintiff was terminated for just cause as a matter of law because she 
violated Defendant's policy against the disclosure of confidential information to 
persons not employed by Defendant, as set forth in Defendant's Code of Business 
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Ethics and Conduct. Defendant's Code of Business Ethics and Conduct allowed 
Defendant to determine the measure of discipline for breach of its provisions. 
Plaintiff offered no evidence to establish that the Code of Conduct did not apply 
to her, or that Defendant had agreed to different terms with respect to her 
employment. 
6. As a matter of law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing does not create a for-cause standard of dismissal under Utah law; 
therefore, Plaintiffs claim for breach of such a covenant is not cognizable in this 
case. 
7. Plaintiffs claim for failure to pay severance pay fails as a matter 
of law because Plaintiffs discharge was not wrongful, and Plaintiff has presented 
no evidence to establish that Defendant had an obligation to pay severance pay 
to discharged employees. 
See Addendum A. 
The District Court denied Gibson's Rule 59 motion "for the reasons stated in [U S 
WEST'S] opposing memorandum." [R. 923] 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Background 
Gibson began working for Mountain Bell, U S WEST'S predecessor, in April of 1971. 
[R. 124, 222] When Gibson was initially employed by Mountain Bell, she belonged to the 
Communication Workers of America ("Union"). [R. 124, 226-27] In 1989, she transferred to 
U S WEST'S Security Department as a security assistant. [R. 124, 223-24] The Security 
Department was a non-bargained for unit. [R. 125, 227] Therefore, after she began working 
as a security assistant, Gibson was not a member of the Union. [R. 125, 227] 
Notwithstanding the fact that Gibson was not a Union member, she claimed that her 
employment in U S WEST'S Security Department was governed by the terms of the collective 
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bargaining agreement ("CBAW) between U S WEST and the Union, because someone in U S 
WEST'S local employment office told her so prior to her acceptance of the job in the Security 
Department. [R. 670, 716] However, she could not identify that person, nor was there any 
evidence that such person had authority from U S WEST to set the terms and conditions of her 
employment. [R. 695-96, 716] Gibson was unaware of any specific promises made by U S 
WEST to terminate her only for cause, and was unaware of any company publication that sets 
forth what constitutes "just cause" for termination. [R. 287, 695] 
The 1986 Mountain Bell Code of Conduct ("1986 Code") provides in pertinent part: 
Safeguarding the privacy of communications — known as "secrecy of 
communications" — is a fundamental rule of the business. Customers must be 
able to use the network with the knowledge and peace of mind that their usage 
and their communications will be confidential. This is required by law and 
violators are subject to heavy penalties. 
Employees have moral and legal responsibilities to refrain from listening 
to calls, except when it's necessary for the provision of service. Employees must 
keep confidential what they hear and what they see when handling or observing 
calls, records of calls, data transmission or other messages. 
[R. 126, 161] 
The U S West Code of Business Ethics and Conduct ("1989 Code), issued in 1989 as the 
successor to the 1986 Code, provides in pertinent part: 
Confidential Information 
Confidential information includes all information, whether technical, 
business, financial or otherwise, concerning the company, which the company 
treats as confidential or secret and/or which is not available or not made available 
publicly. It also includes any private information of, or relating to, customer 
records, fellow employees, other persons or other companies and national security 
information obtained by virtue of the employee's position. 
* * * 
Confidential company information must not be used for an employee's personal 
gain nor may an employee allow a third-party to use or obtain such information. 
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This is true regardless of the nature of the information or the manner in which 
the information is acquired. 
The 1989 Code also states: 
For these reasons, we cannot contract or even imply that your employment 
will continue for any particular period of time. While you may terminate your 
employment at any time, with or without cause, we reserve the same right. This 
relationship may not be modified, except in writing, signed by an appropriate 
representative of the Company. 
[R. 126-27, 173-74] 
The U S WEST Human Resource Guide states in pertinent part: 
In addition, all employees should recognize that employment at Mountain 
Bell is at will. That is to say that either an employee or Mountain Bell may 
choose to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason, 
without any prior notice. 
[R. 127, 184] 
The U S WEST benefits handbook in effect during 1990 contained the following 
provision in each of thirteen separate sections describing various employee benefits: 
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 
No provision of the Plan or this Summary Plan Description shall give any 
employee any right of continued employment or shall in any way prohibit 
unilateral changes in the terms, or the termination of, the employment of any 
employee covered by the Plan. Termination may occur at any time, with or 
without notice, and for any reason or for no reason. 
[R. 142, 356] 
Gibson was familiar with the 1986 Code, and reviewed it every year. [R. 126, 234-35] 
Daniel Gomez ("Gomez"), Gibson's supervisor in the Security Department, reviewed the 1989 
Code with Gibson every year he supervised her {i.e. 1989 and 1990). [R. 126, 319-20] 
As part of her duties as a security assistant, Gibson handled "telabuse" calls, i.e., 
customer complaints regarding annoying, abusive, or threatening phone calls. [R. 125, 228] 
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In particular, Gibson was responsible for establishing a "trap and trace" for customers who 
authorized it. [R. 125, 228-29] A trap and trace was a procedure by which the telephone 
number of the calling party and the time of the call to the customer was automatically recorded, 
and could be used tahelp identify the harassing caller. [R. 125, 228-31] Information obtained 
from a trap and trace was typically turned over to the local police for further investigation and 
possible prosecution. [R. 229] 
Mary Tolman ("Tolman"), another security assistant who worked with and trained Gibson 
on the telabuse calls, handled Gibson's telabuse duties if Gibson was on vacation or out of the 
office. [R. 125, 232-33] 
Derek Mehl was divorced from his first wife, Brenda Mehl, in July of 1990. [R. 127] 
He began dating Brenda Carlson, Gibson's sister, in early June of 1990. [R. 127, 330] Gibson 
first met Derek Mehl in June of 1990. [R. 127, 242] Gibson knew in June or July of 1990 that 
Derek Mehl and Brenda Mehl did not get along and were often violent with each other. [R. 
128, 269-70] 
In September or October of 1990, Brenda Mehl called the U S WEST Security 
Department where Gibson was employed, seeking information about setting up a trap and trace 
as a result of harassing calls from her ex-husband, Derek Mehl. [R. 128-29, 270-71] Gibson 
gave Brenda Mehl general instructions and sent out an authorization form for her to complete. 
[R. 128, 270-71] Gibson recognized Brenda Mehl's name. [R. 128, 270] After Gibson 
received the call from Brenda Mehl, she told Gomez and Tolman that she could not handle the 
case because it would be a conflict of interest. [R. 128, 271] 
9 
Disclosure of Confidential Customer Information 
On or about December 19, 1990, the Security Department received a customer 
authorization letter from Brenda Mehl requesting a trap and trace. [R. 128, 295-96] Gibson 
was out of the office on vacation. [R. 128, 245, 296] 
On December 20, 1990, while Gibson was still on vacation, Tolman called Brenda Mehl, 
who gave Tolman the requested information and indicated the lines on which she wanted a trap 
and trace to be set. [R. 128, 299] Tolman questioned Brenda Mehl thoroughly with regard to 
the number and content of annoying calls from her ex-husband, Derek Mehl. [R. 129, 297] 
Brenda Mehl told Tolman that she believed the calls were coming from a Smith's Food and 
Drug Center warehouse in the Kaysville area where Derek Mehl was working. [R. 129, 297-98] 
After talking with Brenda Mehl on December 20, 1990, Tolman phoned Gibson's 
residence. [R. 129, 251-52] Gibson was unavailable, so Tolman talked to Gibson's husband 
(who was not a security employee at U S West), and inquired as to the last name of Gibson's 
sister Brenda. [R. 129, 251-52] Gibson's husband later told Gibson about Tolman's call and 
" what was discussed. [R. 129, 251-52] Later that day, when Gibson and her husband went to 
her sister Brenda Carlson's home, Brenda Carlson was on the phone with her ex-husband, 
Dennis Butcher ("Butcher"). Derek Mehl, whom Brenda Carlson was dating at the time, was 
in the dining area, six to twelve feet away. [R, 129, 250, 253-54] After hanging up, Carlson 
told Gibson and Gibson's husband that she was tired of Butcher calling her. [R. 129, 187] 
Gibson responded, "That's funny. Mary [called] from my office today wanting to know your 
last name. Because a Brenda [called] wanting call tracing in Kaysville and Mary thought it 
could be you." [R. 129, 187] 
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Investigation of the Disclosure of Confidential Customer Information 
On the morning of December 21, 1990, Brenda Mehl called the U S WEST Security 
Department, complaining that the trap and trace on her lines had been disclosed, that her ex-
husband, Derek Mehl, had called her and told her that he was aware that she was trying to have 
U S WEST use a trap and trace in her behalf, and that he had identified Gibson as having made 
the disclosure. [R. 130, 255-56, 305-06, 316-17] Gomez then contacted Gibson. [R. 130, 255-
56, 305-06, 316-17] 
Gibson concluded that Derek Mehl must have gained some information from her 
comments to her sister, Brenda Carlson, the previous night, but did not tell this to Gomez during 
their first conversation. [R. 130, 256] After Gomez again talked to Brenda Mehl, he called 
Gibson back a second time on December 21, 1990 and reprimanded her, but did not take further 
action. [R. 130, 256] 
Brenda Mehl then contacted U S WEST'S Security Department in Denver and complained 
about what had happened in U S WEST'S Salt Lake Security Department. [R. 131, 349-54] 
U S WEST then directed a formal investigation. [R. 131, 332-37] Pending the investigation, 
Gibson was suspended without pay. [R. 132, 338-39] 
Even though Gibson was not a member of the Union at this time, she contacted the Union 
on February 26, 1991, because she was concerned about the investigation. [R. 133, 264-68] 
However, the Union declined to represent her in a grievance proceeding. [R. 133, 265-66] 
Following the investigation, Gibson was discharged on March 1, 1993. [R. 8] 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED U S WEST SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS GIBSON NOW APPEALS, 
The District Court was correct in granting U S WEST summary judgment on Gibson's 
claims for breach of implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and for severance pay. 
A. Implied covenant not to discharge without just cause. 
Because she did not have a definite term of employment and was not covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement, under Utah law, Gibson was presumed to be an employee at 
will. To rebut the presumption and avoid summary judgment, she had the burden to produce 
evidence of sufficiently definite manifestations of U S WEST'S intent that her employment status 
be other than at-will. Gibson did not meet this burden. 
Gibson admitted that her position as security assistant was not included in any bargained-
for unit, and that she was not a Union member while holding that position. Nevertheless, she 
claimed that her employment in U S WEST'S Security Department was governed by the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between U S WEST and the Union, because 
' someone in U S WEST'S local employment office told her so prior to her acceptance of the job 
in the Security Department. However, she could not identify that person, nor could she produce 
evidence that such person had authority from U S WEST to set the terms and conditions of her 
employment. Furthermore, not only was Gibson unaware of any specific promises made by U 
S WEST to terminate her only for cause, she was unaware of any company publication that sets 
forth what constitutes "just cause" for termination. Therefore, Gibson did not satisfy her burden 
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by pointing to sufficiently definite manifestations of U S WEST'S intent that her employment be 
other than at-will. 
In contrast, U S WEST'S intent that Gibson's employment be at-will was clearly 
expressed in all of the written materials distributed by U S WEST, including its Human 
Resource Guide, its 1989 Code, and its benefits handbook. An employer's express disclaimer 
of any intent to change the at-will employment relationship increases the burden on an employee 
to show that the employer manifested a contrary intent. Gibson failed to meet this burden. 
Even if there were evidence of an implied covenant not to discharge without cause, 
U S WEST did not breach it, because Gibson was terminated for cause. Gibson was aware of 
the need to protect confidential information, and admitted that her disclosure of it was wrong 
and justified discipline. The 1986 and 1989 Codes, which Gibson reviewed, expressly prohibit 
the disclosure of confidential information, provide that discipline for violations may include 
dismissal, and reserve to U S WEST the right to determine disciplinary measures in its sole 
discretion. Gibson's disclosure of confidential information directly violated U S WEST'S 
expressed policy and justified dismissal under the applicable provisions of the Code of Conduct. 
B. Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Utah law does not recognize an implied in law covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
that creates a for-cause standard for dismissal in a contract of employment. Therefore, the 
District Court correctly granted summary judgment on Gibson's claim for breach of such a 
covenant. 
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C. Severance pay. 
The District Court correctly granted U S WEST'S motion for summary judgment on 
Gibson's claim for severance pay, because she produced no evidence that U S WEST was 
obligated, contractually or otherwise, to pay severance pay to a discharged employee. 
n . THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
GIBSON'S RULE 59 MOTION. 
The District Court's denial of Gibson's Rule 59 motion can only be disturbed for an 
abuse of discretion. The District Court did not abuse its discretion. Gibson's motion was 
merely an attempt to reargue the motion for summary judgment. Although Gibson 
inappropriately sought to confuse the District Court with issues of credibility and foundation, 
the real issue before the District Court was whether summary judgment was appropriate under 
applicable Utah case law and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Gibson's argument that U S WEST waived objections to introduction of statements 
Gibson made in her deposition is a red herring; U S WEST merely pointed out that Gibson's 
testimony failed to identify an employee who made a hearsay statement, and failed to provide 
any evidence of the unidentified person's authority to bind U S WEST; hence that person's 
statement cannot be imputed to U S WEST. Gibson's argument that U S WEST inappropriately 
challenged Gibson's credibility is likewise a red herring; the District Court was well aware that 
credibility is not an issue in a summary judgment proceeding, and there is no evidence that the 
District Court ruled on the basis of credibility of the affiants or deponents. The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in ignoring Gibson's red herrings, nor in finding that Gibson had not 
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satisfied her burden to rebut the presumption of at-will employment, that there was no error of 
law, and that summary judgment was appropriately granted under Rule 56. 
ARGUMENT 
H. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED U S WEST SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON GIBSON'S BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT CLAIM. 
A. Introduction 
Under Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment 
should be entered against a "party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 
(1986). See also, Matsushita Electric Indus. Co.. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 
106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). 
A movant who would not have the burden of proof on a claim at trial is not required to 
support a motion for summary judgment with evidence, but may satisfy its burden by pointing 
out that there is no evidence to support a non-movant's case. The burden then shifts to the non-
moving party to demonstrate through the production of probative evidence that an issue of fact 
remains to be tried. If the non-movant does not produce evidence beyond the pleadings showing 
a genuine issue of material fact on that element of the claim, summary judgment should be 
granted. Celotex. 477 U.S. at 323-25. 
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Gibson alleged that U S WEST breached an implied contract of employment when it 
terminated her. In its order granting summary judgment dated November 9, 1995, the District 
Court found that "plaintiff was an employee at-will" and that "plaintiff failed to present 
admissible evidence sufficient to satisfy her burden [of showing that her at-will employment had 
been modified]." See Addendum A. The District Court correctly granted U S WEST summary 
judgment on Gibson's breach of implied contract claim.3 
B. Gibson Was Employed At-Will, 
Under Utah law, if an employment contract has no specified term or duration, an at-will 
relationship is presumed. Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). 
This presumption can be rebutted by proof that the parties "intended a specific term or agreed 
to terminate the relationship for cause alone," id., but this proof is sufficient only if it meets 
traditional rules of contract formation. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 1002 
(Utah 1991). A plaintiffs mere "subjective understandings or expectations" are insufficient. 
Rose v. Allied Development Co.. 719 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1986). 
Here, U S WEST did not intend to alter Gibson's at-will employment status in the 
Security Department; rather, all written materials re-affirmed U S WEST'S intent to maintain 
the at-will employment relationship. 
3
 The existence of an implied employment contract is an appropriate matter to be determined 
on summary judgment. For cases in which Utah courts granted summary judgment on implied 
contract claims, see Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992); Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol. Inc.. 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991); Robertson v. Utah Fuel Company. 889 P.2d 
1382 (Utah App. 1995); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah App. 1994); 
Kirberg v. West One Bank. 872 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1994). 
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C. Gibson Has Not Produced Evidence of Any Enforceable Promises Which 
Modified Her At-Will Status, 
Gibson has the burden of proving that U S WEST objectively manifested its intent to 
modify the presumed at-will employment relationship. Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1001; see Evans 
v. GTE Health Systems Inc.. 857 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah App. 1993), affid 878 P.2d 1153 (Utah 
1994). Further, Gibson must show that 1) any alleged manifestation of U S WEST'S intent was 
sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision, and 2) that any alleged manifestation was 
of such a nature that she reasonably believed U S WEST was making an offer of employment 
other than employment at-will. Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1001. Gibson did not and cannot meet 
this burden. 
Gibson cannot identify any specific promises that U S WEST made to terminate her only 
for cause, nor is she aware of any company publication that sets forth what constitutes "just 
cause" for termination. [R. 134, 695] To the contrary, Gibson relies only upon her subjective 
"understanding," based upon her perception of how Union and non-Union employees were 
treated and upon how two supervisors acted. [R. 695] Gibson could not recall any specifics nor 
could she distinguish between her perception of the practice and any statements by other 
employees. [R. 134, 695] Gibson's subjective understanding is clearly insufficient under the test 
set forth in Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1002; see also, Kirberg v. West One Bank. 872 P.2d 39, 42 
(Utah App. 1994) (employee's breach of implied contract claim fails because employee's 
"understanding" and "what she was taught" did not support her claim that discipline should be 
progressive and that she should not have been terminated arbitrarily or without cause). Further, 
the Utah Supreme Court has never held that an employer's conduct and oral disclosures alone 
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could create an implied-in-fact employment contract. Kirberg. 872 P.2d at 41, citing Hodgson 
v. BunzlUtah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). 
Although Gibson claimed that U S WEST breached an implied contract of employment 
consisting of the terms of the CBA, she admitted that she was not covered by the CBA because 
she was not a Union member and her position as a Security Assistant was not included in any 
bargained-for unit. [R.125] To support her position, Gibson relied upon a hearsay statement 
of an unidentified employee in U S WEST'S employment office, who told her that her 
employment would be governed by the CBA. [R. 695] 
Gibson's reliance on that statement is misplaced, because there is no evidence on the 
record that such a person was authorized to make a statement in complete contravention of 
U S WEST'S published statements that employment with U S WEST is at will. Furthermore, 
such a statement by a non-party to the action, which would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay, 
could be an admission against interest by a party (i.e. U S WEST) only if the agency of the 
maker of the statement is established. See Rules 801(c), 801(d)(2), Utah R. Evid.; Larson v. 
Wycoff Co.. 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981). Gibson made no attempt to establish such 
agency. 
In Larson, the court held that a supervisor's assurances about the continuance of 
insurance benefits when the plaintiff/employee transferred to another department could not be 
imputed to the employer. The court stated the general rule as follows: 
Declarations or admissions of an officer or agent of a corporation are not binding 
upon it, nor admissible in evidence against it for any purpose, unless they were 
made by the officer or agent in the course of a transaction on behalf of the 
corporation, and within the scope of his authority, or unless they were expressly 
authorized by the corporation, or have since been ratified by it. 
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624 P.2d at 1155, quoting 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations Sec. 733. 
It was Gibson's burden, not U S WEST'S, to lay a sufficient foundation to enable the 
phantom statement of an unidentified employee to be imputed to U S WEST; that is, Gibson had 
to produce evidence that the employee who made the statement was authorized to make an offer 
of employment on behalf of U S WEST, contrary to U S WEST'S published statements of its 
at-will policy. Since Gibson could not even identify the employee, much less produce evidence 
of that employee's position or other evidence of authority, she did not sustain her burden. 
D. U S WEST Intended Gibson's Employment to be At-Will. 
All of the written materials distributed by U S WEST re-affirm U S WEST'S intent to 
maintain an at-will employment relationship. U S WEST'S Human Resource Guide, quoted in 
Gibson's Complaint (R. 695), contains the following at-will disclaimer: 
Nothing contained in this handbook should be interpreted as creating a contract 
of employment, either expressed or implied, between Mountain Bell and 
employees. . . . In addition, all employees should recognize that employment at 
Mountain Bell is at-will. That is to say that either an employee or Mountain 
Bell may chose to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any 
reason and without any prior notice. 
[R. 184, emphasis added] In her deposition, Gibson identified the Guide as the document she 
referred to in her Complaint. [R. 237-38] 
In addition to its Guide containing at-will language, on page 1 of the 1989 Code of 
Business Ethics and Conduct, U S WEST specifies that the employment relationship between it 
and its employees is at-will. This section reads as follows: 
[U S WEST] cannot contract or even imply that your employment will continue 
for any particular period of time. While you may terminate your employment at 
any time, with or without cause, we reserve the same right. This relationship 
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may not be modified, except in writing signed by an appropriate representative 
of the company. 
[R. 167] 
In addition to the at-will disclaimers in the Guide and in the 1989 Code, all U S WEST 
employees, including Gibson, received a benefits handbook effective June 1, 1987, and revised 
July 1, 1989. In each of the thirteen sections of the handbook describing various employee 
benefit programs, the following language appears: 
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 
No provision of the Plan or this Summary Plan Description shall give any 
employee any right of continued employment or shall in any way prohibit 
unilateral changes in the terms, or the termination of, the employment of any 
employee covered by the Plan. Termination may occur at any time, with or 
without notice, and for any reason or for no reason. 
[R. 356] (emphasis added). 
In light of the language in the Guide, the 1989 Code, and the benefits handbook, it is 
impossible to conclude that U S WEST intended anything other than at-will employment. 
Furthermore, Utah courts have consistently found that in determining whether an employer 
intended to change an employee's at-will employment, an employer's express disclaimer of any 
intent to change the at-will employment relationship precluded the formation of an implied 
contract. Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1002-03; Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1313 
(UtahApp. 1994): Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah App. 
1994); Kirberg v. West One Bank. 872 P.2d 39, 41-42 (Utah App. 1994); Hodgson v. Bunzl 
Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992). 
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E. U S WEST Complied With Anv Alleged Implied Contract, 
Even assuming Gibson could prove that an implied employment contract existed that 
required that termination be for just cause, U S WEST satisfied this requirement because Gibson 
was terminated for admittedly wrongful conduct that violated the 1989 Code, compromised U 
S WEST'S security policies and procedures, endangered and led to harassment of a customer, 
and caused U S WEST considerable harm through having to defend a lawsuit by the customer. 
Notwithstanding that the District Court correctly found that no implied contract had been 
created, the District Court was also correct in finding that: 
Even if an implied covenant not to discharge except for just cause existed, 
Plaintiff was terminated for just cause as a matter of law because she violated 
Defendant's policy against the disclosure of confidential information . . . as set 
forth in Defendant's Code of Business Ethics and Conduct. Defendant's Code of 
Business Ethics and Conduct allowed Defendant to determine the measure of 
discipline for breach of its provisions. 
See Addendum A, 5 5. 
Where an employer's policies and procedures concerning discharge are proved to be part 
of an employment contract, summary judgment is appropriate if the employer followed the 
discharge procedures. See Caldwell v. Ford. Bacon & Davis. 777 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1989). 
Gibson's termination occurred as a result of her breach of security and confidentiality regarding 
the Brenda Mehl incident. 
Both the 1986 and 1989 Codes addressed the protection of confidential information.4 
4
 The 1986 Code provides in pertinent part: 
Safeguarding the privacy of communications — known as "secrecy of 
communications" ~ is a fundamental rule of the business. Customers must be 
(continued...) 
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The 1989 Code provides that an employee shall not "allow a third party to use or obtain 
[confidential] information. This is true regardless of the nature of the information or the manner 
in which the information is acquired." [R. 174, emphasis added] Gibson's behavior in the Mehl 
incident directly violated this provision of the Code. Gibson allowed Derek Mehl to obtain 
confidential information which he used to his advantage and to the detriment of Brenda Mehl 
and U S WEST. Gibson's disclosure of confidential information was in violation of company 
policy and the Code. 
In her deposition, Gibson admits that she did something wrong, albeit "inadvertently." 
[R. 293] Gibson's disclosure was inadvertent only in the sense that she may not have known 
that Derek Mehl would use the disclosed information to render the trap and trace useless and to 
4(... continued) 
able to use the network with the knowledge and peace of mind that their usage 
and their communications will be confidential. This is required by law and 
violators are subject to heavy penalties. 
Employees have moral and legal responsibilities to refrain from listening 
to calls, except when it's necessary for the provision of service. Employees must 
keep confidential what they hear and what they see when handling or observing 
calls, records of calls, data transmission or other messages. 
An entire section of the 1989 Code addresses "Confidential Information and Privacy of 
Communications." This section provides in pertinent part: 
Company policy and various laws protect the integrity of the company's 
confidential information which must not be divulged except in strict accordance 
with established company policies and procedures. The obligation not to divulge 
confidential company information is in effect even though material may not be 
specifically identified as confidential and the obligation exists during and 
continues after employment with the company. 
[R. 126-27] 
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harass the very customer that U S WEST was trying to help. However, she obviously intended 
to make the statement that Derek Mehl overheard, knew that it was based on confidential 
information obtained from U S WEST, and knew or should have known that Derek Mehl would 
overhear it. In this sense her disclosure was not inadvertent at all. In any event, the Code 
makes it clear that even an inadvertent disclosure of confidential information constitutes a breach 
of company policy. 
Gibson was aware of the need to protect confidential information. Each year when 
employees received the Code, they initialed an Acknowledgment Receipt 
("Acknowledgement").5 This Acknowledgement stated: 
I agree that I will not, except as required in the conduct of Mountain Bell 
Business or when properly authorized in writing, publish, disclose, use, or 
authorize anyone else to publish, disclose or use any private, confidential or 
proprietary information that I may have in any way acquired, learned, developed 
or created by reason of my employment. 
[R. 709] 
Gibson's behavior in the Mehl incident directly violated this Acknowledgement, as well 
as the confidentiality provisions of the 1986 and 1989 Codes. Gibson disclosed confidential 
information in the presence of Derek Mehl, who overheard and used the information to further 
harass Brenda Mehl, the customer who had requested U S WEST'S assistance and authorized 
the trap and trace on her lines. Gibson's serious breach of confidentiality resulted in a lawsuit 
5
 Since Gibson was a Union member in 1986, 1987, and 1988, she did not sign the 
acknowledgment; rather, she requested that her supervisor sign the acknowledgment for her, 
[R. 700] 
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against U S WEST from Brenda Mehl. The District Court was correct as a matter of law that 
such egregious behavior justified dismissal. 
Furthermore, the 1989 Code makes it clear that a disclosure such as Gibson's was 
grounds for dismissal. Under the section of the 1989 Code entitled "Discipline," the Code 
clearly lists "Dismissal" as a disciplinary action that U S WEST may take against an employee 
who violates the Code. This same section of the Code also states: 
The disciplinary action appropriate to a given matter will be determined by the 
company in its sole discretion. The company's rules and regulations regarding 
proper employee conduct will not be waived in any respect. Violation is cause 
for disciplinary action including dismissal. 
[R. 701] Gibson cannot now complain that U S WEST exercised its discretion to dismiss her 
for her admitted breach of its strong policy against disclosure of confidential information. 
In summary, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on Gibson's implied 
contract claim for the following reasons: 
1) Gibson was presumed to be an at-will employee under Utah law; 
2) Gibson did not rebut this presumption by producing sufficiently definite 
evidence that U S WEST intended to modify her at-will status; 
3) the unambiguous, express terms of the Guide, the Code and the benefits 
handbook unequivocally established that U S WEST intended that Gibson be 
employed at-will; 
4) the at-will disclaimers preclude the conclusion that U S WEST intended 
an implied contract contrary to the at-will relationship; and 
5) even if an implied contract was created, U S WEST complied with the terms of 
such contract when it terminated Gibson for cause. 
Accordingly, the District Court properly granted U S WEST summary judgment on Gibson's 
claim for breach of implied contract. 
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m . THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING U S WEST SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON GIBSON'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
The District Court was correct when it ruled: 
As a matter of law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not 
create a for cause standard of dismissal under Utah law; therefore, Plaintiffs 
claim for breach of such a covenant is not cognizable in this case. 
See Addendum A, 1 6. 
Gibson alleged a claim for wrongful termination based on breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Gibson based this claim on her belief that the investigation 
conducted by U S WEST'S independent investigator was inadequate and because her supervisor, 
Gomez, had already verbally reprimanded her. [R. 13-14] Gibson further states "U S WEST'S 
efforts to unilaterally change Ms. Gibson's contract and to renounce it in total constitutes 
extreme bad faith and the most unfair of dealings." [R. 671] As shown above, Gibson did not 
show that U S WEST intended to modify her at-will status as an employee in the Security 
Department. Therefore, she cannot rebut the presumption under Utah law that she was 
employed at-will.6 
A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails because 
Utah recognizes no for-cause standard for dismissal in the at-will employment context. 
Sanderson v. First Leasing Co.. 844 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah 1992); Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 
P.2d 828, 840 (Utah 1992); Loose v. Nature-All Corp.. 785 P.2d 1096, 1097-98 (Utah 1989); 
6
 Further, because U S WEST complied with any implied contract when it dismissed Gibson 
for cause, there was no breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1046-47 (Utah 1989). In Sanderson, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Three times in the past three years, we have refused to recognize an implied-in-
law covenant of good faith and fair dealing that creates a for-cause standard for 
dismissal (citations omitted). As we explained in Brehany. although every 
contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith, that implied covenant 
"cannot be construed . . . to establish new, independent rights or duties not 
agreed upon by the parties." 
Sanderson. 844 P.2d at 308 (citing Brehany v. Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991)). 
For the above reasons, the District Court correctly found that Gibson's claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails under existing Utah law. 
IV. GIBSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO SEVERANCE PAY DAMAGES, 
The District Court was correct in granting U S WEST'S motion for summary judgment 
on Gibson's claim for severance pay. The Court stated: 
Plaintiffs claim for failure to pay severance pay fails as a matter of law because 
Plaintiffs discharge was not wrongful, and Plaintiff has presented no evidence to 
establish that Defendant had an obligation to pay severance pay to discharged 
employees. 
See Addendum A, 1 7. Gibson submitted absolutely no evidence to support a theory that she 
was entitled to any severance pay upon involuntary separation from employment with U S 
WEST. She cannot reasonably claim that she was entitled to severance pay as a result of her 
involuntary termination for wrongful conduct that harmed U S WEST. Nor can she claim that 
she was entitled to severance pay upon termination as an at-will employee, whether with or 
without cause. Accordingly, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment on her 
claim for severance pay. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
GIBSON'S RULE 59 MOTION. 
Although Gibson fails to expressly argue in her brief the District Court's denial of her 
Rule 59 motion, it must be addressed because Gibson includes in her appeal issues of foundation 
and credibility that were raised for the first time in her Rule 59 motion.7 
The District Court's denial of Gibson's Rule 59 motion can be disturbed on appeal only 
for an "abuse of discretion." Moon Lake Elec.. 767 P.2d at 128 (finding that the trial court 
properly denied plaintiffs Rule 59 motion).8 The District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
Gibson's Rule 59 motion claimed that the District Court had made an error of law [R. 
808-09]. Therefore, the issue before the District Court was whether it had properly granted 
summary judgment under applicable Utah case law and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
7
 Although Gibson may claim that these issues arose out of the summary judgment pleadings 
and hearing, Gibson raised no objections during the summary judgment briefing or oral 
argument. The first time these issues were raised was in Gibson's memorandum in support of 
her Rule 59 motion. [R. 812] Indeed, the "credibility" issue was raised for the first time in 
Gibson's reply memorandum in support of her Rule 59 motion. [R. 844] Because Gibson did 
not brief the denial of her Rule 59 motion, it is uncertain whether these issues are properly 
before the Court. However, U S WEST addresses the propriety of the denial of Gibson's Rule 
59 motion here because it was identified in Gibson's notice of appeal and docketing statement. 
8
 In Moon Lake, as grounds for its motion, plaintiff (Moon Lake) argued that its "untimely 
filed affidavits . . . 'clearly establish the injustice that will be accomplished if said summary 
judgment is allowed to stand.'" Id. at 128. In the present case, Gibson also relies upon an 
untimely filed affidavit to support her Rule 59 motion asking that the summary judgment be 
overturned. As in Moon Lake, this Court should find that there was no abuse of discretion. 
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The District Court properly granted summary judgment because Gibson did not meet her 
burden under Rule 56 and applicable Utah case law.9 However, Gibson tried to distract the 
District Court with red herrings such as foundation and credibility. The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion when it disregarded Gibson's red herrings and focused on the real issue-
whether Gibson satisfied her burden under Johnson and whether it had properly granted 
summary judgment under Rule 56. 
A* Foundation, 
In her brief, Gibson states that U S WEST had "never before attacked Ms. Gibson's 
testimony concerning her conversation with the U S WEST employment office." She also cites 
Rule 32(c)(3)(B), Utah R. Civ. Proc, stating that it "prevents this type of surprise attack." 
Gibson Brief at 11-12.10 On the contrary, U S WEST'S comments in oral argument about the 
inadequacy of Gibson's testimony to defeat summary judgment was not a "surprise attack", and 
Gibson is wrong in stating that the issue had not been raised before oral argument. 
U S WEST raised the issue of Ms. Gibson's conversation with the U S WEST 
employment office in both its Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment 
("Memo in Support") and in its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary 
9An extensive discussion of Gibson's failure to meet her burden of establishing the existence 
of an implied employment contract under Utah law is found in Point I., supra. 
10
 The only case cited by Gibson in support of her argument, D&L Supply v. Saurini. 775 
P.2d 420 (Utah 1989), does not support the proposition that objections not made in a deposition 
are waived. In D&L. the court merely held that the opponent of a motion for summary 
judgment had waived his objections to affidavits containing hearsay statements "when he failed 
to object at the trial court." 775 P.2d at 421. There was no discussion of objections in a 
deposition, much less of waiver of such objections or of Rule 32(c)(3)(B). 
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Judgment ("Reply Memo"). In its Memo in Support, U S WEST had an entire section devoted 
to this issue. This section is entitled Gibson's Argument That Verbal Representations Created 
An Implied Contract Consisting Of The Terms In The Collective Bargaining Agreement Fails 
As A Matter Of Law. [R. 139] In its Reply Memo, U S WEST specifically addressed Gibson's 
allegation that someone in the employment office told her that her employment would be 
governed by the CBA, and showed that this allegation was insufficient under the Johnson test 
and that summary judgment was appropriate under Rule 56. [R. 695-96] 
During Gibson's deposition, she was asked: 
Q [Mr. Jensen] Can you tell me who among the management 
personnel11 made those statements to you [that the terms of the CBA would 
apply to Gibson's job in the Security Department]? 
A [Ms. Gibson] The employment office. 
Q Do you recall any particular individual who made the statements? 
A No. I'm sorry, I can't. 
Q But you don't have any recollection about who particularly told you 




 The complaint had alleged that Gibson "was told by management personnel that although 
the security office had been excluded from the bargaining unit, the terms and conditions of the 
CBA would dictate the terms and conditions of her employment." [R. 2-3] 
12
 The quoted testimony formed the basis on which U S WEST argued its motion for 
summary judgment, to the effect that Gibson had failed to produce evidence of a sufficiently 
(continued...) 
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On the basis of Gibson's inability to identify a specific individual, U S WEST argued in 
its Reply Memo that Gibson's allegation that an unidentified person told her that her job in the 
Security Department would be governed by the CBA is insufficient under the Johnson test 
because Gibson did not satisfy her burden by pointing to "sufficiently definite" manifestations 
of U S WEST'S "intent" to modify the terms of her employment. Notwithstanding Gibson's 
attempt to turn this into a foundation issue by citing Rule 32, it is not a foundation issue; 
12(...continued) 
definite offer by U S WEST of employment other than at will-the person who supposedly had 
made the statement could not be identified, nor could that person's authority to offer employment 
on terms different from U S WEST'S publications be established. 
Gibson filed her complaint on September 28, 1993. However, for the next 20 months 
she failed to conduct any discovery directed toward ascertaining the identity or authority of the 
mystery person who allegedly told her that her employment in the security department would 
be governed by the CBA. 
U S WEST'S motion for summary judgment was filed May 23, 1995, yet argument on 
the motion was not heard until October 2, 1995. Thus Gibson had over four months to submit 
an affidavit in opposition to the motion, but did not do so. It was not until November 3, 1995, 
after the court had granted summary judgment, after Gibson had filed her Rule 59 motion, and 
after U S WEST had filed its memorandum in opposition to the Rule 59 motion, that Gibson 
submitted an affidavit in which she purported to recall the first name of the person in the U S 
WEST employment office who supposedly told her that her employment in the Security 
Department would be governed by the CBA. In her Rule 59 motion reply memorandum, Gibson 
sought to use that affidavit, even though it was untimely, U S WEST had no opportunity to rebut 
it, and Gibson herself recognized that it had not been properly filed, where she stated: "If 
permitted, Ms. Gibson would file the attached Affidavit." [R. 846] Gibson never sought leave 
to file the affidavit. 
Even if Gibson had properly filed her affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, it should have been disregarded, since a party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment may not rely on an affidavit contradicting prior deposition testimony. See, e.g., 
Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys. 762 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Utah 1988); Webster v. Sill. 675 
P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983); Gaw v. State by and through Dep't of Trans.. 798 P.2d 1130, 
1140 (Utah App. 1990); Floyd v. Western Surgical Assoc. 773 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah App. 
1989). See generally, 10A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2726, 
1995 Pocket Part at 31-32. 
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instead, it is simply an issue of Gibson not having satisfied her burden under Utah law.13 [R. 
695-96] 
B. Credibility. 
Gibson argues that because U S WEST'S Reply Memorandum in support of its summary 
judgment motion placed the word "someone*1 in quotation marks when referring to Gibson's 
allegation that "someone" in the employment office said her employment would be governed by 
the CBA, U S WEST was inappropriately attacking Ms. Gibson's credibility, and that such a 
practice is reversible error. This argument is ludicrous. In its Reply Memorandum, U S WEST 
states: 
Furthermore, Gibson's claim that "someone" in the employment office told her 
that her employment would be governed by the CBA, is insufficient under the 
. Johnson test. Gibson depo. at 26. 
[R. 696] 
Several sentences later, in the same paragraph, U S WEST states: 
Not only does Gibson not satisfy her burden by pointing to "sufficiently definite" 
manifestations of U S WEST'S "intent" to modify the terms of her employment, 
13
 Gibson appears to be claiming that U S WEST should have objected to her answer based 
on lack of foundation. Not only would this be highly unusual, it is nonsensical in light of the 
fact that Gibson was asked to identify who had made the statement and she said that she "can't," 
indicating that she did not have personal knowledge to answer the question. There is nothing 
objectionable about a witness responding that she lacks knowledge to answer a question. To 
raise a foundation issue in response to U S WEST'S argument that Gibson failed to satisfy her 
burden is disingenuous. In any event, if a foundation objection was proper (which it was not), 
Gibson's counsel should have objected to U S WEST'S question. However, as Gibson points 
out, any objection thereto has now been waived under Rule 32. 
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but based upon her testimony, she cannot even legitimately argue that she 
"reasonably" believed her employment was being modified.14 
The deposition page cited (p.26) is the page on which Ms. Gibson states that she does 
not know who made this statement to her. It is clear from the context that "someone" is in 
quotes to reflect that Gibson did not know who made the statement. For purposes of summary 
judgment, U S WEST assumed that the statement was made by someone, but simply argued that 
Gibson had the burden of showing not only that the statement was made, but that the speaker 
had authority to bind U S WEST by the statement. Without both elements, the statement could 
not be imputed to U S WEST. 
This is not a credibility issue; rather, U S WEST was arguing that because Gibson does 
not know who made the statement to her, her allegation is insufficient under the Johnson test. 
Specifically, the statement was not a "sufficiently definite" manifestation of U S WEST'S intent 
to modify the terms of her at-will employment, as required by Johnson.15 The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in holding that Gibson had failed to sustain her burden. 
14
 In the paragraph in question, not only is "someone" in quotes, but the words "sufficiently 
definite," "intent," and "reasonably" are in quotes as well. 
15
 Gibson also claims that because U S WEST'S counsel referred to the statement as one 
"supposedly" made, this is also an attack on Gibson's credibility. It should be noted that this 
issue was first raised, improperly, in this appeal. Gibson brief at 11-12. Notwithstanding this, 
Gibson's argument is ridiculous. There is no difference in stating that a statement was 
"supposedly" made and in referring to it as an "alleged statement." In the context of an oral 
argument, neither such statement could possibly be viewed as an attack on credibility. Gibson 
would like to have this appeal decided on semantics rather than the true issues; she would have 
Utah attorneys frantically watching every word said during an oral argument. This issue merits 
no further discussion. 
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In her Rule 59 motion, Gibson also argued that the unidentified person in the U S WEST 
employment office was an "agent" for U S WEST, thus binding U S WEST by his or her 
statement to Gibson. Gibson has no evidence that the unidentified employee was authorized to 
make an offer of employment on behalf of U S WEST, contrary to U S WEST'S published 
intent. All the evidence supports the opposite conclusion. Disregarding this, Gibson supports 
her argument with an inapposite conclusory quote on apparent authority. See Appellant's Brief 
at 12-13. Gibson assumes that the unidentified speaker was clothed with apparent authority 
without proper evidence to support that conclusion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly set out the necessary elements for establishing 
apparent authority. 
In order to show apparent authority, the following must be established: 
(1) that the principal has manifested his [or her] consent to the exercise of such 
authority or has knowingly permitted the agent to assume the exercise of such 
authority; (2) that the third person knew of the facts and, acting in good faith, 
had reason to believe, and did actually believe, that the agent possessed such 
authority; and (3) that the third person, relying on such appearance of authority, 
has changed his [or her] position and will be injured or suffer loss if the act done 
or transaction executed by the agent does not bind the principal. 
Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd.. 855 P.2d 204, 209 (Utah 1993). 
Gibson cannot satisfy the threshold element, that U S WEST manifested its consent that 
the unidentified employee had authority to make an offer of employment on behalf of U S 
WEST, contrary to its published intent, or that it knowingly permitted its employee to make such 
an offer. Gibson did not even establish that the person who made the statement was even 
employed in U S WEST'S employment office, nor that the person was a management level 
employee, much less that the person's job duties included the determination of the terms and 
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conditions of jobs offered by U S WEST. See Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 
(Utah 1981) (statements of a corporate officer or agent are not binding on the corporation, nor 
admissible in evidence, unless there is evidence that the officer or agent was acting within the 
scope of his authority in a transaction on behalf of the corporation, or unless the statement was 
expressly authorized or ratified by the corporation); Brown v. Caldwell School Dist.. 898 P.2d 
43, 48 (Idaho 1995) ("apparent authority cannot be created by the acts or statements of the 
alleged agent alone." The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of school district on 
employee's contract claim because assistant superintendent lacked apparent authority to contract 
with employee). 
In Larsen, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer 
where a supervisor promised plaintiff continuing insurance benefits, contrary to the written 
policy in the insurance benefits handbook. 624 P.2d at 1151. Gibson's claim that an 
unidentified U S WEST employee changed the terms of her employment-contrary to the terms 
in all of U S WEST'S written materials-is similarly flawed. See Larsen, 624 P.2d 1151; 
Demetracopoulos v. Strafford Guidance Center. 536 A.2d 189, 193 (N.H. 1987) (corporation's 
executive director lacked apparent authority to enter into employment contract with plaintiff 
where the terms of the contract were beyond the scope of and directly contrary to the guidelines 
of the company's manual); Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Company. 495 So.2d 1381, 1385-86 
(Ala. 1986) (court affirmed summary judgment in favor of company, holding that personnel 
supervisor lacked apparent authority to offer "permanent" employment to plaintiff which was 
contrary to company's standard at-will employment contract); Hassett v. Swift & Company. 388 
N.W.2d 55, 59 (Neb. 1986) (court affirmed summary judgment in favor of corporation, holding 
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that city sales manager for corporation lacked apparent authority to agree that company would 
"bridge" employee's six-month departure from company for purposes of calculating employee's 
pension where such promise was contrary to the specific written provisions of the pension plan). 
Finally, even if the unidentified U S WEST employee did make the alleged statement, this 
employee lacked apparent authority because "[e]ven the president of a corporation has no 
apparent authority to bind the corporation to an unusual, extraordinary, or unreasonable 
contract." Id. at 59 (citation omitted). 
Because she has pointed to no evidence that U S WEST manifested its consent to having 
an unidentified employee in its employment office make an offer of employment contrary to its 
expressed policy of at-will employment, Gibson's apparent authority argument is just another 
red herring. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting that argument. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly granted U S WEST summary judgment on Gibson's implied 
contract claim because: 1) Gibson was presumed to be an at-will employee under Utah law; 2) 
Gibson did not rebut this presumption by satisfying her burden of proving that U S WEST 
intended to modify her at-will status; 3) the unambiguous, express terms of the Guide, the 1989 
Code, and the benefits handbook unequivocally established that U S WEST intended that Gibson 
be employed at-will; 4) the at-will disclaimers preclude the formation of an implied contract 
which would alter the at-will relationship; and 5) even if an implied contract was created, U S 
WEST complied with the terms of such contract when it terminated Gibson for "just cause." 
The District Court also correctly dismissed Gibson's claim for breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, because Utah recognizes no for-cause standard for dismissal in 
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the at-will employment context. Further, because U S WEST complied with any implied 
contract when it dismissed Gibson for just cause, there was no breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Because Gibson had absolutely no evidence that U S WEST owed her severance pay, the 
District Court correctly granted summary judgment on her severance pay claim. 
Not only did the District Court not abuse its discretion in denying Gibson's Rule 59 
motion, it ruled correctly. Gibson's arguments about foundation and credibility are red herrings 
that should be wholly disregarded. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's denial of Gibson's Rule 59 
motion, and the dismissal of Gibson's claims for breach of implied contract, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for severance pay. 
DATED this j 3 _ day of September, 1996. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Floy^rA. Jensen 
Janet Hugie Smith 
Frederick R. Thaler 
Attorneys for U S West Communications 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH A. GIBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
a Colorado corporation. 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 930905599CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
BY THE COURT: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the 
Court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge, presiding, on October 2, 
1995, at 9:00 a.m. Defendant was represented by Floyd A. Jensen, and Plaintiff 
was represented by Charles Bennett. The motion was argued to the Court, and 
the Court took the matter under advisement. Having reviewed the arguments of 
counsel and the memoranda and other materials on file supporting and opposing 
the motion, including depositions and affidavits, relying on the reasons set forth in 
Defendant's supporting memoranda, and being thus fully advised in the premises, 
the Court rules that there are no genuine issues of material fact pertaining to 
Defendant's motion, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
•K f\TsTivrr\TTVC 7V 0 0 0 f> 4> 
dismissing Plaintiffs complaint, and each cause of action therein, for the following 
reasons: 
1. Because Plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence that she was 
employed for a definite term, the law presumes that Plaintiff was an employee at 
will, whose employment could be terminated by Defendant at any time, for any 
reason or for no reason, with or without notice. 
2. The presumption of at-will employment is reinforced by statements in 
Defendant's publications, all of which were issued prior to Plaintiffs termination, 
to the effect that employment with Defendant is at will. Such statements establish 
Defendant's intention to create or maintain an at-will employment relationship 
with its employees, including Plaintiff. 
3. To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff had the burden to present admissible 
evidence showing that notwithstanding its published statements that employment 
with Defendant is at will, Defendant manifested a contrary intent and 
communicated that intent to Plaintiff in a manner sufficiently definite to operate 
as a contract provision, and that the communication was of such a nature that 
Plaintiff could reasonably believe that Defendant was making an offer of 
employment other than employment at will. 
4. Plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence sufficient to satisfy her 
burden, as described above. Plaintiffs deposition testimony that an unidentified 
person in Defendant's employment office told Plaintiff that her employment in 
Defendant's Security Department would be governed by the terms and conditions 
of a collective bargaining agreement is insufficient to raise an issue of material 
fact. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was not a member of the union during her 
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tenure in the Security Department. Furthermore, the statement cannot be 
imputed to Defendant in the absence of foundational evidence as to the identity or 
authority of the person making the statement. Such evidence was wholly lacking. 
Finally, neither Plaintiffs understanding of her employment relationship, nor 
Defendant's general assurances regarding an ongoing employment relationship, 
are sufficient to demonstrate Defendant's intent to alter Plaintiffs presumed at-
will status. 
5. Even if an implied covenant not to discharge except for just cause existed, 
Plaintiff was terminated for just cause as a matter of law because she violated 
Defendant's policy against the disclosure of confidential information to persons 
not employed by Defendant, as set forth in Defendant's Code of Business Ethics 
and Conduct. Defendant's Code of Business Ethics and Conduct allowed 
Defendant to determine the measure of discipline for breach of its provisions. 
Plaintiff offered no evidence to establish that the Code of Conduct did not apply to 
her, or that Defendant had agreed to different terms with respect to her 
employment. 
6. As a matter of law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does 
not create a for-cause standard of dismissal under Utah law; therefore, Plaintiffs 
claim for breach of such a covenant is not cognizable in this case. 
7. Plaintiffs claim for failure to pay severance pay fails as a matter of law 
because Plaintiffs discharge was not wrongful, and Plaintiff has presented no 
evidence to establish that Defendant had an obligation to pay severance pay to 
discharged employees. 
8. Plaintiffs defamation claim is barred by the one year statute of limitations 
3 
Q'frfl* 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4). Even if a discovery rule applied, Plaintiff knew 
of the defamatory statements more than one year prior to filing her complaint. 
Alternatively, even if the statute of limitations were not a bar, the alleged 
defamatory statements were qualifiedly privileged, because they were made by and 
to persons who had a legitimate interest in Plaintiffs discharge from employment, 
and Plaintiff presented no evidence of excessive publication or actual malice on 
the part of Defendant. 
9. Plaintiff stipulated in open court and in her opposing memorandum that her 
negligence claim may be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court does not address the 
merits of that claim. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that (1) Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment is granted, and (2) Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its 
entirety, with prejudice, Plaintiff to bear the costs in the sum of $ . 
Dated this _ TOfay otQetffir-1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of October, 1995,1 caused a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING COMPLAINT to be hand delivered to the following: 
Charles M. Bennett 
Blackburn & Stoll 
77 W. 200 South 
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RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
U S WEST Communications, Inc. 
'fUrd Judical District 
NOV 2 8 1995 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH A. GIBSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
a Colorado corporation. 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
RULE 59 MOTION AND 
OBJECTION 
Civil No. 930905599CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
BY THE COURT: 
Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion for Denial of U S WESTs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and her Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order, together with 
supporting and opposing memoranda, were duly presented to and considered by 
the Court pursuant to a Notice to Submi£ for Decision. Having reviewed the 
memoranda and other materials on file supporting and opposing the motion, and 
being thus fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiffs 
Motion and Objection are denied. 1 
Dated this TO/tiav of lM~ 1995. 
BYTHEPCOURT: 
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APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
A^forney for Plaintiff 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of November, 1995,1 caused a copy of 
the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS RULE 59 MOTION AND OBJECTION 
to be mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Charles M. Bennett 
Blackburn & Stoll 
77 W. 200 South 
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84101 
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